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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the atrocities committed in Cambodia, southern
Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Haiti, many in the
international community have called for the creation of ad hoc or
standing international criminal courts to deal with some types of
international delicts. Courts are indispensable institutions in many
domestic criminal and civil systems, and any polity, no matter how
structured, must have arrangements, of varying degrees of institutionalization, to apply the law to concrete cases. But lest we fall victim to
a judicial romanticism in which we imagine that merely by creating
entities we call "courts" we have solved major problems, we should
review the fundamental goals that institutions designed to protect
public order seek to fulfill. Goal clarification is especially important
when our passions are engaged, as indeed they should be, upon
encountering atrocities such as those of Rwanda. Indignation can be
a powerful and productive source of political energy, but only if we
tap it to stimulate the design of institutions that protect, restore, and
improve public order.
National legal systems allocate different responsibilities to
criminal and tort law, but common to all legal systems is a set of
fundamental sanctioning goals for the protection, restoration, and
improvement of public order. While these fundamental goals have
been expressed in many versions, they may be synthesized into seven
specific goal programs:'
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(1) Preventing discrete public order violations that are about to
occur;
(2) Suspending public order violations that are occurring;
(3) Deterring, in general, potential public order violations in the
future;

(4) Restoring public order after it has been violated;
(5) Correcting the behavior that generates public order violations;
(6) Rehabilitating victims who have suffered the brunt of public
order violations; and

(7) Reconstructingin a larger social sense to remove conditions that
appear likely to generate public order violations.
Preventing is an anticipatory public order function. It anticipates

the imminent rupture of public order and seeks to intervene before
the rupture eventuates, with the aim of obviating it. Once a rupture
has occurred, suspending seeks to arrest the injuries by focusing on the
agent of the violation. It involves an immediate response to the
breach of public order, terminating the breach and containing the
destructive effects of the act. While preventing and suspending are
specific to particular violations of public order, deterring is more
general. Deterring involves the use of various conjectural devices to
craft current responses that encourage putative violators in the future
to refrain from violations. Deterrence may be accomplished by
credible threats of consequences for violations and/or indulgences and
rewards for compliance. Correctinginvolves identifying and adjusting
individual or group patterns of behavior that have generated or may
generate ruptures of public order. Rehabilitating focuses on the
victims and may involve compensation in various forms designed to

redress injuries. Social reconstructing involves identifying social
situations that generate or provide fertile ground for violations of
public order, and introducing resources and institutions that can
obviate such situations.
These seven goals are cumulative in the sense that an efficient
public order system performs all of them, though the achievement of
some goals, such as prevention and deterrence, will reduce the
importance of some of the others. The common denominator of all
of these goals, however, should be to protect, reestablish or create a
public order characterized by low expectations of violence and a
heightened respect for human rights. When the institutions assigned
to fulfill these goals are effective, disruptions of the public order will
be minimized and the destructive consequences of those that do occur
will be contained.
For those who would design institutions for the protection of
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public order, a mode in which the international community currently
finds itself, the challenge is not to imitate or transpose but rather to
shape institutions that, in their idiosyncratic context, will fulfill the
protective goals of public order.
II. INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES TO PROTECT PUBLIC
ORDER
A wide range of international institutions and practices are
currently used in different combinations for accomplishing the goals
discussed above. Although a variety of international practices can be
used in the proper context to protect public order, there are eight
institutional practices and arrangements that are particularly important:
(1) human rights law, the law of state responsibility, and the
developing law of liability without fault;
(2) international criminal tribunals;
(3) universalization of the jurisdiction of national courts for certain
delicts, called international crimes;
(4) nonrecognition or the general refusal to recognize and to allow
violators the beneficial consequences of actions deemed unlawful;
(5) incentives in the form of foreign aid or other rewards;
(6) commissions of inquiry or truth commissions;
(7) compensation commissions; and
(8) amnesties.
These practices and institutional arrangements are not interchangeable. Each deals with a different aspect of the problem and may not
be appropriate for all circumstances. Additionally, each practice or
institution need not be consistent with all the sanctioning goals in
every case. Some may provide high returns for certain goals in
particular cases, but may also prove very costly for alternative goals
in other instances. For example, major cash payments or other
concessions may prevent an imminent violation or secure the release
of hostages, but will have high costs for deterrence in the future, as
other actors may calculate that they too can extort concessions from
the community by threatening to violate public order. On the one
hand, international criminal tribunals may serve to deter violations in
future cases, but may increase the costs of suspending ongoing
violations if violators conclude that continued resistance is preferable
to facing a judgment by the tribunal. On the other hand, amnesties
may facilitate suspension of ongoing violations, but amnesties also
undermine deterrence, the law of state responsibility, and human

178

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:175

rights. Prospective violators may conclude that if they do not prevail,
they can negotiate an amnesty.
Criminal tribunals involve the identification of perpetrators of
violations of the law, confirmation of the norms that apply, and the
imposition of penalties. Depending on the nature and goals of
incarceration, criminal tribunals may be corrective. Although the
international community often demands criminal tribunals when there
are serious breaches of public order, tribunals only indirectly perform
sanctioning goals. Punishment (far from certain) may have a deterrent
effect and/or may suspend violations by depriving certain individuals
of their liberty. In contrast, the focus of compensation tribunals or
commissions shifts from the perpetrator of the crime to the victim of
the crime, for whom some compensation is established and paid
according to standards for the actors involved. Human rights law, the
law of state responsibility, and the more recent "liability without fault"
regime,2 altogether provide substantive and procedural standards for
state and nonstate actors as well as guidance for compensation
tribunals. For instance, commissions of inquiry, now often referred to
as "truth commissions", involve, with varying degrees of system and
rigor, authoritative investigation and publication of violations of
international norms. These institutions seek to perform a wide range
of sanctioning goals.
Amnesties have been singled out recently as a technique for
reestablishing internal public order after its violent disruption within
a nation-state.3 Their compatibility with sanctioning goals will depend
on their design and other contextual features. Amnesties are
especially useful tools for prison administrators and political negotiators. For the administrator of a prison, the authority to grant amnesty
on a discretionary basis is a technique of internal control; many
prisoners will behave well if they think that there is a high probability
that they will be rewarded with a shortened sentence or complete
amnesty. For the political negotiator, whether in a domestic or
transnational conflict, the capacity to offer amnesty is also an
indispensable tool. If the elite and substantial parts of the rank-andfile of one side anticipate that a consequence of a peace agreement
2. See generally Summary Records of the Meetings of the Fourty-FourthSession, [1992] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992. (explanation of the concept of
"international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by
international law").
3. For example, amnesties were the institution of choice in such countries as Argentina,
Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.
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will be their prosecution for acts undertaken in the course of the
conflict, they hardly will be disposed to lay down their arms. The
strict application of law in these circumstances may result in continued
intense conflict, with the consumption of the social values that the law
entails, ended only by the elimination or the unconditional surrender
of one side. Furthermore, because a political elite often will be highly
dependent on the morale and commitment of its rank-and-file, the
prospect of a negotiated settlement that secures amnesties for the
leadership but not for those in the ranks well may prevent that
leadership from concluding an agreement.
Amnesties also may be important as a technique for stitching
together the wounds in civil society that precipitate and often result
from conflicts. Article 6(5) of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 provides:
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty
for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned
or detained. 4
However, there are significant protective public order costs to
amnesties.
The jurist may have the luxury of time to foresee long-term
strategy while the political negotiator usually faces sharp time
demands requiring quick tactical decisions. Thus the jurist is more
likely to appreciate that the most urgent objective in the application
of law is not to punish those who may have violated it, but to sustain
the expectations of law's effectiveness in the minds of all other
potential violators. Acts of kindness or grace to current violators may
have very high, long-term costs: potential violators may assume that,
threats of strict application of law notwithstanding, when the time
comes for settlement, they, too, can strike a bargain in which they will
be forgiven.
III. INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES APPLIED
How have the seven fundamental goals for the protection,

4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977,

1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614.
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restoration, and improvement of public order been realized in recent
practice? I propose to consider, very briefly, three institutions in three
different areas that present, in ensemble, a range of possibility and
instructive experience.
A. El Salvador
The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (the El Salvador
Commission) was part of the 1991 peace agreement between the
government and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion
Nacional (FMLN).5 The United Nations instructed the El Salvador
Commission to write, in six months, an investigative report about
serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980.6 There were
three commissioners and a staff of some twenty people.7 Priscilla
Hayner, in her study of fifteen truth commissions, writes that the El
Salvador Commission,
was created at the end of a bitter civil war that left much of the
country polarized, such that it would have been extremely difficult
to create a national truth commission, staffed and directed by
Salvadorans. This was due to the fragile political foundation on
which the transition towards peace depended .... I
The El Salvador Commission's report cited more than forty individuals
for human rights violations.9 Five days after the report, the government enacted a general amnesty; thus, there were no trials for human
rights violations.'" The fact of the amnesty makes it difficult to
appraise the independent effect of the El Salvador Commission on the
restoration of public order. The level of violence in El Salvador has
markedly diminished, and the FMLN has been integrated into the
political process. In this sense, public order can be said to have been
restored. However, other sanctioning goals may not have been
fulfilled. Because the El Salvador Commission's report had no "hard
law" effect, but the amnesty certainly did, it is possible that the
Commission unwittingly deflected criticism from the sweeping
5. 1993 U.N.Y.B. 314, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1.
6. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974 to 1994: A ComparativeStudy, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 628 (1994).
7. ld.
8. Id.
9. Report of the Commission on the Truthfor El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12Year War in El Salvador, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993).
10. Hayner, supra note 6, at 629.
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amnesty.
B. Former Yugoslavia
The United Nations Security Council established the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (the Tribunal). The
purpose of the Tribunal was less to punish serious violators and to
secure compliance with obligations under international law and more
to press the parties to a peace agreement; to suspend, prevent and
deter. Consider the sequence of resolutions that culminated in the
establishment of the Tribunal. In Resolution 764 of July 13, 1992, the
Security Council affirmed that all parties to the conflict were "bound
to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law
and in particular the Geneva Conventions ... ."" In Resolution 771
of August 13, 1992, the Council acknowledged that its previous
resolution had gone unheeded and expressed alarm at the continuing
reports of widespread violations. 2 At that time, the Council decided,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, that all parties and others
concerned in the former Yugoslavia and all military forces in BosniaHerzegovina should comply with the terms of Resolution 764."s If
they did not, the Council would take further action. Once again, those
parties whose cooperation was necessary did not cooperate.
In Resolution 780 of October 6, 1992, the Security Council
requested the Secretary-General to establish an impartial commission
of experts to examine and analyze the information that had been
requested in Resolution 771.14 The Secretary-General submitted the
results of that commission's inquiry to the Security Council in a letter
on February 9, 1993, in which he noted that the commission had
concluded, not surprisingly, that grave breaches and other violations
of international humanitarian law had been committed. 5 The
Security Council subsequently resolved in Resolution 808 of February
22, 1993, that the widespread violations of humanitarian law constituted a "threat to peace" within the meaning of Article 39 of the

11. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992).
12. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
13. Id.

14. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).
15. Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof
the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
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Charter, and determined to put an end to such crimes.16 Rather than
designing a program of prevention, the primary goal in the protection
of public order, the Security Council said that it would establish an
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. 7
The Tribunal was established not by treaty, but rather by a
decision taken under Chapter VII. Because Article 25 of the Charter
makes such decisions binding on all Member States, the net result was
in effect a universal treaty establishing a tribunal. The speed and
simplicity of creating the Tribunal under the authority of Chapter VII
is not without cost. Once the contingency for action under Article 39
ceases, the legal basis of the Tribunal vanishes as quickly as
Cinderella's coach disappeared at the stroke of midnight. The
Secretary-General's report states, with remarkable equanimity, that
[a]s an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, however, the life
span of the international tribunal would be linked to the restoration
and maintenance of international peace and security in the territory
Yugoslavia, and Security Council decisions related
of the former
18

thereto.

Thus, the moment a peace agreement was secured between the
warring factions, the life of the Tribunal would end. But in the
ordinary course of events it is precisely at the end of a conflict that
the operation of an international criminal tribunal comes into
operation. The Tribunal may, in fact, surmount this genetic limitation.
People drive institutions, and gifted and dedicated personnel can make
an institution acquire an organic life of its own. It could then serve
as precedent justifying the expansion of Security Council power
beyond the contingencies of urgency in Article 39 and stimulate
opposition on that ground. Ift as I read the Secretary-General's
report, the purpose and essential design of the institution was to
accomplish multiple goals, then wind down when those goals were
secured, the constitutional problem of the expansion of Security
Council power will not arise.
It is certainly too early to appraise the degree of success or failure
the
Tribunal in achieving the goals of its creators. The Tribunal has
of

16. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
17. Id
18. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
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not been effective as a deterrent to date; despite its operation,
atrocities continue to occur with alarming regularity, and there may
have been more "ethnic cleansing" in the Krajina and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina since the Tribunal's establishment than before it. The
Tribunal is not an instrument in the dispute resolution process, and
could be an impediment to such processes when they get under way.
Whether tribunals and possible convictions change this pattern
remains to be seen.
C. Iraq
Another technique that is available to the international community as to crimes of war focuses less on the punishment of the perpetrator and more on the compensation and rehabilitation of the victim.
The Iraq War Crimes Commission (the Iraq Commission) is a good
example of this technique, for it focuses primarily on making whole
those who suffered as a result of the Iraqi aggression. In this regard,
the Iraq Commission addresses the goals of restoring, rehabilitating,
and reconstructing, but in a way that frustrates the goals of preventing
and deterring. This curious contradiction occurs because although a
collective entity called Iraq is to pay damages, there is a perverse lack
of logic in who is actually making the payment.
Reparations make economic and moral sense. They help victims
to repair themselves while compelling aggressors to contribute to the
reconstruction. For reparations to achieve their goals, however, they
must be distributed to those who were injured and come from those
responsible for the injury. The United Nations reparations plan for
the Gulf War fails in this respect.
The Security Council designated Iraq the guilty party and hopes
to create an enormous fund by taking, indefinitely, anywhere from ten
to fifty percent of Iraq's oil revenues. 9 The Iraq War Crimes
Commission wil divide the fund among victim states and their
nationals.'
Saddam Hussein reportedly takes a five percent cut on every
barrel of oil sold by Iraq and has stashed billions in foreign banks and
enterprises.2 ' Jules Kroll, of Kroll Associates, an international

19. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
20. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph19 of Security Resolution 687,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991).
21. Charles Bremner, CIA of Wall St. Tracks Down Dictator's Multibillion Hoard, THE
TIMES (London), Mar. 26, 1991, at 10.
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detective firm specializing in financial crimes, has reported that
Hussein siphoned off about $10 billion, or 5 percent of Iraq's oil
revenues, during the 1980s.' Every time Iraq has concluded a deal
with Japan, according to Kroll, 2.5 percent of receipts go into a
Japanese bank account for Hussein? According to Kroll,
[t]his is an organised crime activity that has been going on for a
long time.... He's [Saddam] put together a network through some
very clever colleagues that is as extensive and as far-reaching and
as pernicious as we've seen. 4
The U.N. plan does not target Hussein's hoard; it targets the Iraqi
people's future earnings. The Iraqi people will not only have to pay
the United Nation's ten to fifty percent, but Saddam Hussein's five
percent as well. Long into the future, Iraqis, themselves victims, will
strain to pay off this debt as they try to rebuild their shattered
country. Meanwhile, Hussein and his colleagues will cry injustice-all
the way to the bank. By making "Iraq" the aggressor and requiring
its political economy to foot the bill, the Security Council actually
punishes one of the victims while it protects the truly guilty perpetrators. The compensation scheme frustrates the moral and political
value of the whole exercise.
If reparations are to make sense and to be consistent with all
protective public order goals, aggressors, and not victims, must pay.
Iraq certainly should disgorge what it seized from Kuwait, but if Iraq
is required to sacrifice a large part of its oil revenues, the reparations
may hinder Iraq's reconstruction-a reconstruction that is critical to
its own internal amelioration and to regional stability. It would make
much more sense, in terms of sanctioning goals, to target the money
Saddam Hussein and his associates have spoliated.'
Saddam Hussein and his crew should be forced to surrender their
ill-gotten gains. The Security Council has the authority under the
U.N. Charter to create an international commission to track the Iraqi
leader's accounts and to oblige banks around the world to surrender
them. The United Nations should use that authority to protect the
people and not the thieves masquerading as their government.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See W. Michael Reisman, Harnessing InternationalLaw to Restrain and Recapture

Indigenous Spoliations, 83 AM. J. INT'L LAW 56 (1989).
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The Iraqi illustration underlines the importance of taking account
of all sanctioning goals when designing institutions to protect public
order. While, in the Iraqi case, compensation is secured for the
victims, the arguably more important goals of prevention and
deterrence are frustrated. There is no incentive for would-be
lawbreakers to refrain from their plans, for failure will cost them
nothing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The design of institutions for protecting and reestablishing public
order at the international and national levels often fails to take
sufficient account of the theoretical and policy problems involved in
these tasks. There is no general institution that can be applied as a
paradigm for all circumstances. In each context, an institution
appropriate to the protection and re-establishment of public order in
the unique circumstances that prevail must be fashioned such that it
provides the greatest return on all the relevant goals of public order.
The situations in Rwanda and Haiti are object lessons. Substantial
pressure has come, largely from the non-governmental organization
(NGO) community, for the establishment of international criminal
tribunals in each of those states. One may wonder, considering the
context and the set of goals that must be addressed in the design of
such institutions, whether a criminal tribunal is the optimum modality
for restoring public order. In Rwanda, where the victorious group is
enthusiastically in favor of such a tribunal, the exercise is in danger of
becoming a technique by which the ruling elite, with international
blessing, purges the leadership of the opposition. In such circumstances, a truth commission may provide more of a return on the public
order goals at issue. The situation in Rwanda is particularly disquieting, for reports indicate that arms continue to flow into militia camps
in Zaire in preparation for another round of conflict.
In circumstances in which the international community is
prepared to defeat an adversary, application of a criminal law model,
through an international tribunal, makes sense. It directs the
condemnation, of violations of international law, at the defeated
government officials and legitimizes a process of social reconstruction.
In circumstances in which the international community is not prepared
to defeat the party deemed in violation of international law but
ultimately must negotiate a settlement with that party, the criminal
law model makes no sense because it only delays the inevitable
negotiation. Unquestionably, the tribunal model is much more
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satisfying in a moral and legal sense because it provides vivid
confirmations of international authority. But if the international
community is unwilling to pay the price for this satisfaction, it must
settle for something less, like a truth commission.
In Haiti, too, some have called for the establishment of an
international criminal tribunal. As in Rwanda, there is no question
that the leadership has committed or is responsible for dreadful
violations of human rights. Yet, whether such a tribunal will assist in
the reestablishment of public order must be examined, and whether
such a tribunal will prevent and deter in the future remains to be
determined.
The lesson to be learned from this review, I submit, is that the
varied circumstances of the international community are such that,
rather than a single institution, a toolbox of different institutions
should be on hand. These tools may be adapted and used in
particular circumstances to fulfill, in the most optimal fashion possible,
the fundamental goals of international law: the protection and
reestablishment of public order. In circumstances in which the
international community is prepared to defeat an adversary, an
international tribunal, applying an approximation of the domestic
criminal law model, is an effective strategy. In circumstances in which
the international community is unwilling to make such an investment-and such reluctance seems to be more often than not the order
of the day-it is preferable to emphasize techniques that reestablish
public order as quickly as possible and fulfill feasible sanctioning goals
of public order.

